Traditionally, actuaries have used run-off triangles to estimate reserve (“macro” models, on agregated data). But it is possible to model payments related to individual claims. If those models provide similar estimations, we investigate uncertainty related to reserves, with “macro” and “micro” models. We study theoretical properties of econometric models (Gaussian, Poisson and quasi-Poisson) on individual data, and clustered data. Finally, application on claims reserving are considered.
There were a lot of posts, recently, related to those topics, starting with Noah Smith ‘s piece entitled “Economics has a Math Problem” and more recently “Econometrics, Math, and Machine Learning…what?” by Matt Bogard. I don’t have (yet) a clear mind on those issues, but there are still a few thoughts that I wanted to share. I did not really want to, but I’ve been asked, on Twitter, and I thought it might be good to write them down, to clarify some ideas I have, but also (probably, hopefully) to get interesting feedbacks.
I will give a talk on “Modeling Dynamic Incentives: Application to Basketball” at the GERAD (Groupe d’études et de recherche en analyse des décisions) on
June, 10th June, 6th. This is some joint work with Nathalie Colombier and Romuald Elie
An important aspect of the strategy of most organizations is the provision of incentives to the employees to meet the organization’s objectives. Typically this implies tying pay to performance (see Prendergast, 1999). In order to reward employees for their effort, ﬁrms spend considerable resources on performance evaluations. In many cases, evaluation consists of comparing actual performance to a pre-deﬁned individual target. Another frequently used format is relative performance evaluation. Relative performance evaluation may motivate employees to work harder.But it may also be demoralizing and create an excessively competitive workplace, which may hinder overall performance; see Lazear (1989). Determining the overall impact of relative performance evaluation is crucial for companies. Economic research on relative performance evaluation has mainly focused on the comparison of ﬁnal performances between competitors,like in tournament theory, and on quantitative and subjective performance ratings (Lazear and Gibbs, 2009). In contrast, what happens during a competition and the impact of feedback frequency on effort have so far received little attention. Following Berger and Pope (2011), we decided to use a basketball application to get a better understanding of the role of the feedback information. Sports datasets allow to observe score and team behavior continuously (during a game but also during the season) which can be use as a proxy of the effort. Berger an Pope (2010) asked ”can loosing lead to winning ?” looking at the impact of the halftime score difference on winning probability in NCAA (college) and NBA (pro) games. More precisely, they studied whether a team loosing at halftime is more likely to win than expected using a logit model. They ﬁnd that usually the higher the score difference the more likely the are to win. But if the halftime score difference is around 0 they observe a discontinuity: loosing with a small difference (e.g. down by 1 point) can lead to increase the effort and win the game. In this paper we try answer the question ”when loosing lead to winning ?”.