Tag Archives: solidarity

The Government Will Foot the Bill!

This post was initially written in French https://freakonometrics.hypotheses.org/87308

Who has never heard this phrase? It comes back almost automatically as soon as a collective risk becomes visible. After a flood, after a wildfire, after a storm, after a drought that lasts too long, you hear, in passing conversation or in an op ed, a formula that sounds like both an obvious truth and a conclusion. That familiar The Government Will Foot the Bill, which I have kept as the title of this post. Sometimes it appears in a gentler form, The government must take responsibility. Sometimes in a harsher after the fact form, They have to pay. In every case, the phrase says something about our relationship to the collective, to solidarity, to justice, and to public money. It also says something about the way we turn a disaster into a political problem.

I wanted to write a post that starts from this formula, not to decide whether the claim is true or false, but to understand what it means, what it hides, and what it forces us to make explicit. The expression has a particular power. It seems simple, but it compresses very different ideas, sometimes contradictory. It can express an expectation of protection. It can express anger. It can express a demand for justice. It can express a vague belief in an unlimited common pot (that famous magic money, as we call it in French) to reuse the well known phrase. It can also express a feeling of individual powerlessness. And depending on the country, the history of institutions, and lived experience of risk, the word government does not evoke the same thing. Still, it is worth noting that this debate about who pays often starts too late, because trying to clarify the government will foot the bill is already turning the phrase into a programme, fiscal and moral.

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Insurance against Natural Catastrophes: Balancing Actuarial Fairness and Social Solidarity

Our research paper, Insurance against Natural Catastrophes: Balancing Actuarial Fairness and Social Solidarity, with Molly James and Laurence Barry, is now published in the Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance.

Natural disasters offer a special case for the study of private and public insurance mix. Indeed, the experience accumulated over the past decades has made it possible to transform poorly known hazards, long considered uninsurable, into risks that can be assessed with some precision. They exemplify however the limits of the risk-based premiums method, as it might imply unaffordability for some. The French scheme reflects such ideas and offers a wide coverage for moderate premiums to all, but is shaken by climate change: we show that some wealthier areas, that were not perceived as “at risk” in the past, have become exposed to submersion risk in the future. This singularly makes some well-off properties the potential main beneficiaries of a scheme that was historically thought to protect the worst-off. Acknowledging that some segmentation might become desirable, we examine several models for flood risk and the disparity in premiums they entail.

Insurance against Natural Catastrophes: Balancing Actuarial Fairness and Social Solidarity

Our research paper, Insurance against Natural Catastrophes: Balancing Actuarial Fairness and Social Solidarity, with Molly James and Laurence Barry, is now available.

Natural disasters offer a special case for the study of private and public insurance mix. Indeed, the experience accumulated over the past decades has made it possible to transform poorly known hazards, long considered uninsurable, into risks that can be assessed with some precision. They exemplify however the limits of the risk-based premiums method, as it might imply unaffordability for some. The French scheme reflects such ideas and offers a wide coverage for moderate premiums to all, but is shaken by climate change: we show that some wealthier areas, that were not perceived as “at risk” in the past, have become exposed to submersion risk in the future. This singularly makes some well-off properties the potential main beneficiaries of a scheme that was historically thought to protect the worst-off. Acknowledging that some segmentation might become desirable, we examine several models for flood risk and the disparity in premiums they entail.