Over the past decade alternatives to traditional insurance and banking have grown in popularity. The desire to encourage local participation has lead products such as peer-to-peer insurance, reciprocal contracts, and decentralized finance platforms to increasingly rely on network structures to redistribute risk among participants. In this paper, we develop a comprehensive framework for linear risk sharing (LRS), where random losses are reallocated through nonnegative linear operators which can accommodate a wide range of networks. Building on the theory of stochastic and doubly stochastic matrices, we establish conditions under which constraints such as budget balance, fairness, and diversification are guaranteed. The convex order framework allows us to compare different allocations rigorously, highlighting variance reduction and majorization as natural consequences of doubly stochastic mixing. We then extend the analysis to network-based sharing, showing how their topology shapes risk outcomes in complete, star, ring, random, and scale-free graphs. A second layer of randomness, where the sharing matrix itself is random, is introduced via Erdős–Rényi and preferential-attachment networks, connecting risk-sharing properties to degree distributions. Finally, we study convex combinations of identity and network-induced operators, capturing the trade-off between self-retention and diversification. Our results provide design principles for fair and efficient peer-to-peer insurance and network-based risk pooling, combining mathematical soundness with economic interpretability.
We consider an economy composed of different risk profile regions wishing to be hedged against a disaster risk using multi-region catastrophe insurance. Such catastrophic events inherently have a systemic component; we consider situations where the insurer faces a non-zero probability of insolvency. To protect the regions against the risk of the insurer’s default, we introduce a public-private partnership between the government and the insurer. When a disaster generates losses exceeding the total capital of the insurer, the central government intervenes by implementing a taxation system to share the residual claims. In this study, we propose a theoretical framework for regional participation in collective risk-sharing through tax revenues by accounting for their disaster risk profiles and their economic status.
I will be in Chicago next week, invited by 冯润桓 (Runhuan Feng). On Monday, with Jan Dhaene and Marco Mirabella, we will give some short courses “on decentralized insurance and risk sharing“.
Then, we will attend the IME Congress 2024 (that will be held between July 9th and 11th).
The peer-to-peer (P2P) economy has been growing with the advent of the Internet, with well known brands such as Uber or Airbnb being examples thereof. In the insurance sector the approach is still in its infancy, but some companies have started to explore P2P-based collaborative insurance products (eg. Lemonade in the U.S. or Inspeer in France). The actuarial literature only recently started to consider those risk sharing mechanisms, as in Denuit and Robert (2021) or Feng et al. (2021). In this paper, describe and analyse such a P2P product, with some reciprocal risk sharing contracts. Here, we consider the case where policyholders still have an insurance contract, but the first self-insurance layer, below the deductible, can be shared with friends. We study the impact of the shape of the network (through the distribution of degrees) on the risk reduction. We consider also some optimal setting of the reciprocal commitments, and discuss the introduction of contracts with friends of friends to mitigate some possible drawbacks of having people without enough connections to exchange risks.
"sendo l'intento mio scrivere cosa utile a chi la intende…"