Tag Archives: natural catastrophe

Natural disasters, avoidable or unpredictable?

We’ve all seen the images. And they are incredible. Like many natural disasters.

On 25 January, Niscemi, a small Sicilian town, split in two, after the torrential rains associated with Storm Harry, leaving a scar several kilometres long. We saw roads collapsing, cars vanishing, houses left hanging on the edge of a void. More than 1,600 people were evacuated. In the Guardian article, we are reminded that this was not the first time. We are told that the very same area had already slid in the 18th century, and again in 1997, and yet construction continued, especially from the 1950s and 1960s onwards.

Could we have known? Did we already know? And if we did, why does it still happen? Almost inevitably, after every natural disaster, I find that these questions come back too, again and again… I thought I could write a short post to recall that, on the one hand, there are striking regularities in the way some disasters unfold. But on the other hand, “predictable” does not mean “avoidable”, because disaster is also a social fact, a story of vulnerability, exposure, and public choices (at the risk of repeating myself, I know).
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Talk on Natural Disaster Risk Management

This Thursday, I will be giving a talk at the  International Conference on Applied Business and Economics (ICABE 2016). Meglena Jeleva organized a session on Natural Disaster Risk Management, where I will be talking, with Bertrand Villeneuve and Jean -Christophe Vergnaud. Slides are available below (pdf version is also online).

The paper with Benoît (which inspired the slides) is Natural catastrophe insurance: How should the government intervene?

Natural Catastrophe Insurance: How Should the Government Intervene?

An updated version of the joint paper with Benoit Le Maux is online on http://papers.ssrn.com/.

The present paper develops a new theoretical framework for analyzing the decision to provide or buy insurance against the risk of natural catastrophes. In contrast with conventional models of insurance, the insurer has a non-zero probability of insolvency that depends on the distribution of the risks, the premium rate, and the amount of capital in the company. Among several results, we show that risk-averse policyholders will accept to pay higher rates for a government-provided insurance with unlimited guarantee. However, depending on the correlation between and within the regional risks, a government program can be more attractive to high-correlation than to low correlation areas, which may lead to inefficiencies if the insurance ratings are not appropriately chosen.