Tag Archives: games

2024 Optimization Days, (algorithmic) collusions in games

Tomorrow, I will attend the 2024 Optimization Days, in Montréal. I will present some work we did last Fall with Philipp Ratz and Suzie Grondin, on (algorithmic) collusions in games, “Market Pricing with Reinforcement Learning” (the paper will be available soon)

Several recent articles have attempted to gain a better understanding of algorithmic collusion (Calvano et al. (2020), Klein (2021), Banchio & Mantegazza (2022) Rocher et al. (2023)). For example, in Calvano et al. (2020), a simulation study showed that for a simplified market environment, basic Q-Learning Agents can learn to collude tacitly, in order to propose higher prices and increase their combined profit. Inspired by some Iterated Prisoners Dilemma, we derive some reinforcement learning algorithm to investigate and discuss several recent results and their robustness, and explain how reinforcement learning differs from simpler strategies and which conditions lead to unfavorable outcomes from a consumer perspective. In particular, we first describe the reinforcement learning problem in a more general manner and investigate the influence of the hyper-parameters. We then consider two situations separately. One, similar in spirit to Rocher et al. (2023), assumes that the market is in equilibrium and that a general agent tries to exploit a pricing strategy of an incumbent agent. The second, more general, approach consists of an agent continuously updating their own policy.

The starting point was Calvano et al. (2020),

For classical games, the mathematical framework is the following

for example, with the prisoner’s dilemma

Then, consider repeated games, and possible collusion

The next step is to include randomness, with (dynamic) stochastic games

and standard equations

(I describe quickly the different concepts). Finally, we can move from here to reinforcement learning, and Q-learning

The idea will be to play (or to interact) to learn that matrix

with the following interpretations, for the different parameters

Then, we will play a little bit, on the framework introduced to present the prisoner’s dilemma, for instance to understand the importance of \beta, using in the \epsilon-greedy approach, with \epsilon_t=\exp(-\beta t)

That is our first approach to the concept of collusion : agents don’t need to “cooperate” to have collusion

Then, we will use the experiment of Calvano et al. (2020) to get more complex discussions…

Workshop “Networks, Games and Risk”

Monday we had our workshop “Networks, Games and Risk“,

with Renaud Bourles (Centrale Marseille, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, and Institut Universitaire de France, France), Vincent Boucher (Université Laval, Québec, Canada), Federico Bobbio (Université de Montréal, Montréal, Canada), Leonie Baumann (McGill University, Montréal, Canada), Fallou Niakh (CREST, ENSAE, Institut Polytechnique de Paris, France) and Philipp Ratz (Université du Québec à Montréal, Montréal, Canada)

It was extremely interesting !

Networks, Games and Risk

On Monday, December 18th, 2023, we organize, at UQAM, a workshop on “Networks, Games and Risk“.

Decentralized risk-sharing markets are markets for risk exchange in which a pool of individuals agree to mutually insurer each other, without recourse to a centralized insurance provider. Some important problems to examine in these markets are the following:

  • The coalitional stability of the pool, or the formation of risk-sharing networks (subcoalitions) within the pool.
  • The Pareto-efficiency of allocations along risk-sharing networks.
  • The structure of allocation mechanisms within networks, that is, the mappings that transform feasible allocations into other feasible allocations within networks.

Examining these problems requires an interdisciplinary approach, drawing from economic theory, insurance and actuarial science, game theory, and related fields of applications. It is the aim of this workshop to bring together researchers from various fields, to discuss open problems in the theory of decentralized risk-sharing along networks, as well as potential interdisciplinary approaches to tackle these problems.