Tag Archives: discrimination

Paradoxes of segmentation and discrimination in insurance

This article was originally written in French, and published here

The decision cannot be racist since it was made without any information about the person’s ethnic origin. ” We’ve all heard this kind of statement at one time or another. Whether it’s about racism, ageism, or sexism. Whether it’s about human decisions, models, or algorithms. However, “ Kranzberg’s Law1 reminds us that technology is neither good nor bad, but it is not neutral either. Neutrality may only come at a certain price. And it may be time to revisit the major principles surrounding segmentation and fairness in insurance, to better understand what we’re talking about when we raise the issue of discrimination.

Figure: Krater representing Theseus and Procrustes, and Theseus killing the Crommyon boar (source The Miriam and Ira D. Wallach Division of Art , 1862 – 1864 )

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Les paradoxes de la segmentation et de la discrimination en assurance

La décision ne peut pas être raciste puisqu’elle a été prise sans aucune information sur l’origine ethnique de la personne.” Ce genre d’affirmation, on l’a tous entendu un jour ou l’autre. Que ce soit sur le racisme, l’âgisme ou le sexisme. Que ce soient des décisions humaines, des modèles ou des algorithmes. Pourtant, la “loi de Kranzberg1 nous rappelle que la technologie n’est ni bonne ni mauvaise mais, elle n’est pas neutre pour autant. La neutralité risque de ne venir qu’à un certain prix. Et il est peut être temps de revenir sur les grands principes autour de la segmentation et de l’équité, en assurance, pour mieux comprendre de quoi on parle quand on évoque la question de la discrimination.

Figure: Krater représentant Thésée et Procruste, et Thésée tuant le sanglier de Crommyon (source The Miriam and Ira D. Wallach Division of Art, 1862 – 1864)

Continue reading Les paradoxes de la segmentation et de la discrimination en assurance

  1. La loi de Kranzberg, énoncée par l’historien des technologies Melvin Kranzberg en 1986, a été formulée dans un article intitulé “Technology and History: ‘Kranzberg’s Laws'”, publié dans la revue Technology and Culture. Six lois sont proposées, mais la première est la plus connue, rappelant que les effets de la technologie dépendent du contexte social, politique, économique et culturel dans lequel elle est utilisée: “Technology is neither good nor bad; nor is it neutral.” []

Assurance, IA, biais et équité

Pour compléter mon exposé auprès de l’Association des Masters d’Actuariat, je vais poster un billet, qui reprend les slides de mon intervention, avec un peu du discours qui va avec. Tout d’abord, mille excuses, mais les slides sont en anglais. Et ce que je raconte est très librement basé sur des travaux récents qu’on a pu mener, avec pas mal de monde, dont Laurence Barry (de la chaire PARI), Marie-Pier Côté (professeure à l’université Laval, à Québec), Olivier Côté (doctorant que je co-supervise avec Marie-Pier), Agathe Fernandes Machado (doctorante à l’UQAM), Ewen Gallic, (maître de conférences, à Marseille), François Hu (ancien stagiaire postdoctoral et aujourd’hui consultant en France), Philipp Ratz (ancien stagiaire postdoctoral et aujourd’hui consultant en Suisse), ainsi qu’Ana Patron Pinerez (ancienne stagiaire qui venait de Colombie) et Mulah Moriah (doctorant en France, que j’ai suivi pendant son mémoire de fin de maîtrise).

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Selection bias in insurance: why portfolio-specific fairness fails to extend market-wide

With Marie-Pier Côté and Olivier Côté, we recently upload a short note, selection bias in insurance: why portfolio-specific fairness fails to extend market-wide, now available on SSRN,

Fairness centres on people. In insurance, the scope of fairness should be the entire insured population, not solely an insurer’s clients. However, each insurance company’s portfolio represents a possibly skewed subsample. Models fit to these selection-biased data do not generalise well for the broader population of insureds. Two biases stem from portfolio composition: representation bias, when large prediction errors are made on individuals from subpopulations infrequently observed, and selection bias, when underwriting and marketing skew the portfolio away from the insured population. We examine how portfolio composition affects fair premium methodologies for mitigating direct and indirect discrimination on a protected attribute. We illustrate how unfairness mitigation based on a selection-biased portfolio does not yield a fair market from the perspective of insureds. Relying on causal inference and a portfolio composition indicator, we describe the selection mechanism and determine conditions under which each bias affects various fairness-adjusted premiums. We propose a method to recover the population-wide fairness-adjusted premiums from selection-biased data, by using a (third-party provided) unbiased estimate of the prohibited attribute distribution. We show that this approach effectively mitigates selection bias but leads to overall premiums that are not balanced. In a limiting case, we show that portfolio-specific fairness-aware premiums can lead to a market-wide unawareness strategy: portfolio composition opens the back door to proxy discrimination.

(to be continued…)

Talk at the Financial Conduct Authority, UK

This morning (Montréal time), I will give a talk for the Financial Conduct Authority in London, in the UK, on “Demystify fairness and discrimination in insurance, and avoid some pitfalls“.

What’s unique about insurance is that even statistical discrimination, which by definition is devoid of malicious intent, poses significant challenges. Because, on the one hand, policymakers would like insurers to treat their policyholders equally, without discrimination based on race, gender, age or other characteristics, even if it could make (statistical) sense to (indirectly) discriminate. On the other hand, at the core of actuaries’ activities lies discrimination, between risky and non-risky policyholders. And this risk is often statistically correlated with sensitive characteristics that regulation would like to prohibit insurers from taking into account. The analysis of possible discrimination in decision rules, whether human or algorithmic, is an old subject. Most of the concepts date back at least to the 50s, but recent developments in artificial intelligence have brought these issues back into the spotlight. Massive data facilitate statistical or proxy discrimination, and black-box algorithms do not facilitate understanding. Not to mention the various regulations that make it difficult to collect sensitive information, and ultimately test whether decisions can be discriminated against, especially indirectly.

Measuring and mitigating biases in motor insurance pricing

Our paper, with Mulah Moriah and Franck Vermet, Measuring and mitigating biases in motor insurance pricing, has been recenlty published in the European Actuarial Journal,

The non-life insurance sector operates within a highly competitive and tightly regulated framework, confronting a pivotal juncture in the formulation of pricing strategies. Insurers are compelled to harness a range of statistical methodologies and available data to construct optimal pricing structures that align with the overarching corporate strategy while accommodating the dynamics of market competition. Given the fundamental societal role played by insurance, premium rates are subject to rigorous scrutiny by regulatory authorities. Consequently, the act of pricing transcends mere statistical calculations and carries the weight of strategic and societal factors. These multifaceted concerns may drive insurers to establish equitable premiums, considering various variables. For instance, regulations mandate the provision of equitable premiums, considering factors such as policyholder gender. Or mutualist groups in accordance with respective corporate strategies can implement age-based premium fairness. In certain insurance domains, the presence of serious illnesses or disabilities are emerging as new dimensions for evaluating fairness. Regardless of the motivating factor prompting an insurer to adopt fairer pricing strategies for a specific variable, the insurer must possess the capability to define, measure, and ultimately mitigate any fairness biases inherent in its pricing practices while upholding standards of consistency and performance. This study seeks to provide a comprehensive set of tools for these endeavors and assess their effectiveness through practical application in the context of automobile insurance. Results show that fairness bias can be found in historical data and models, and that fairer outcomes can be obtained by more fairness-aware approaches.

Insurance, Biases, Discrimination and Fairness

Insurance, Biases, Discrimination and Fairness was published a few weeks ago. I still plan to spend some time this summer on the R package, including data and some functions…

This book offers an introduction to the technical foundations of discrimination and equity issues in insurance models, catering to undergraduates, postgraduates, and practitioners. It is a self-contained resource, accessible to those with a basic understanding of probability and statistics. Designed as both a reference guide and a means to develop fairer models, the book acknowledges the complexity and ambiguity surrounding the question of discrimination in insurance. In insurance, proposing differentiated premiums that accurately reflect policyholders’ true risk—termed “actuarial fairness” or “legitimate discrimination”—is economically and ethically motivated. However, such segmentation can appear discriminatory from a legal perspective. By intertwining real-life examples with academic models, the book incorporates diverse perspectives from philosophy, social sciences, economics, mathematics, and computer science. Although discrimination has long been a subject of inquiry in economics and philosophy, it has gained renewed prominence in the context of “big data,” with an abundance of proxy variables capturing sensitive attributes, and “artificial intelligence” or specifically “machine learning” techniques, which often involve less interpretable black box algorithms.

The book distinguishes between models and data to enhance our comprehension of why a model may appear unfair. It reminds us that while a model may not be inherently good or bad, it is never neutral and often represents a formalization of a world seen through potentially biased data. Furthermore, the book equips actuaries with technical tools to quantify and mitigate potential discrimination, featuring dedicated chapters that investigate into these methods.

Fresh from the oven…

14 litres d’encre de chine, 30 pinceaux, 62 crayons à mine grasse, 1 crayon à mine dure, 27 gommes à effacer, 38 kilos de papier, 16 rubans de machine à écrire, 2 machines à écrire, 67 litres de bière ont été nécessaires à la réalisation de cette aventure…

(Goscinny and Uderzo (1965*), Astérix et Cléopâtre)

Almost better than hot, freshly baked bagels…

the textbook Insurance, Biases, Discrimination and Fairness is now out, and just arrived today ! Even though I’ve spent so much time re-reading it, getting nauseous, checking references, quotes, reworking graphics, re-launching codes, etc., it’s still an immense feeling of pride to open your book for the very first time.

Astérix et Cléopâtre est le dernier Astérix de la fameuse Collection Pilote, comme me le rappelait Michel Bera (professeur émérite du CNAM, rattaché à la Chaire de modélisation statistique du risque, et mémoire de la bande dessinée francophone, le “B” du fameux “BDM”, Trésors de la bande dessinée). “Lorsque la collection Pilote a basculé en éditions avec les titres des seuls Asterix dans le menhir, je pense que la phrase a disparu“… C’était la version qui était chez mes grands parents, et que je (re)dévorais, tous les ans, quand j’étais petit.

“Scope and limits of artificial intelligence” at the SCOR foundation monthly webinar

This morning, I will give a talk on “scope and limits of artificial intelligence” at the SCOR foundation monthly webinar. As discussed previsously, we currently have ongoing research on discrimination and fairness founded by the fondation (newsletter #1 is online).

Insurance (and further motivations)

Since we will talk about fairness, I will start with a couple of motivations. The first one is about COMPAS,

Interestingly, we have the data to analyse that one. In the original analysis, conditional on non-re-offending, proportions of being wrongly classified in the two protected groups are significantly different, so the algorithm is racist,

The answer was that actually, conditional on being classified as high risk, the probability of re-offense in the two protected groups are significantly similar, so the algorithm is not racist,

So clearly, we can start to see that it will not be so easy, since using the same data and the same models, two different conclusions can be obtained.

We will also disccuss legal aspects.

This idea of “determining actuarial factor” has been remove in Europe, but we can still find it in Québec

I can also mention some recent projects, in Colorado, where insurers are asked  to predict race and ethnicity (that specific topic is on our agenda for the summer)

And finally, I should stress that discrimination has not much to do with the intention of the statistician. This is the idea of indirect discrimination

I should also mention “redlining“. About 100 years ago, in the US, we started to see maps, created by HOLC (based on City Survey Files, 1935-1940). Those maps contained “red” areas and “green” areas. Bankers were supposed to avoid the red areas, because they were considered too risky.

As a sidenote, we see nowadays some blue-lining related to climate risks,

“Blue-lining,” from the consumer’s perspective, is when banks or mortgage lenders draw lines of risk around certain streets or neighborhoods, often without clear disclosure.

Finally, I just want to recall that algorithms just tend to reproduce what can be observed in data. If there is a difference between men and women, they will reproduce it.

A bit more on insurance

I should also stress an important problem (that could be related to a paper we wrote, in French, a few years ago). Classically, when modeling categorical variables, such as a binary variable y\in\{0,1\}, practitionners just care about getting the good category. On the left, we have pictures of cats and dogs to train a model, then we try on a new picture, that is either a cat or a dog. Somehow, there is a ground truth and it is possible to see if we are right or wrong. Same if we want to detect a disease on medical pictures. Now, if we move to the right. In the middle, we have a model that predicts if it will rain, or not. But here, maybe, what we care about is actually the probability to have rain. On the right, we have the actuarial problem of modeling claims frequencies. We do not want to predict who will claim a loss, but we want a good estimator of the probability to claim a loss. The challenge, clearly, is that we cannot observe that one. We cannot observe the latent risk factor. We only observe if people got an accident or not. But some people with a very small probability can still claim a loss. And very bad drivers can actually be very lucky, and got no accident one year.

Again, in insurance, we care more about the score, the estimation of the probability than the class \widehat{y}. So we can slightly modify standard fairness definitions, to be based not on predicted classes \widehat{y}, but on the score m(\boldsymbol{x},s). As we will discuss, there are usually three general definitions of so-called “group fairness”

Quantifying unfairness with optimal transport

Let us start with demographic parity. A weak version is that, on average, scores in the two groups should identical (or close). An alternative is the strong version, asking for equalities in distributions : for any set \mathcal{I}\subset[0,1], the probability that the score is in \mathcal{I} (e.g. between 40% and 60%) should be the same in the two groups.

Mathematically, we need a distance between the distributions of scores in the two groups. And a popular distance is Wasserstein distance, that is related to optimal transport.

The empirical version is perhaps easier to understand, and mapping is based on matching of individuals. xxx

As a cultural sidenote, a couple of slides to explain why it has to do with “optimal transport”, going back to Monge (1781)‘s problem. It’s all about transporting the sand, grain by grain, from the hole to the pile. Below, we have a (purely) random transport. Which is not efficient at all…

and then the optimal version (for a strictly convex cost function), he leftmost grain in the hole goes on the lefttmost part of the stack, etc.

Mitigation

For mitigation (once we have observe that there was discrimination, as discussed previously) heuristically, we want to be somewhere in between the two distributions in the two subgroups,

Being “in between” can be interpreted locally: for someone in group A, it should be between (weights are related to proportions in the two groups) the prediction, as someone in group A, and then some sort of counterfactual in the other group, namely the prediction that person would have obtained if she had been in group B, based on the same probability level,

For the other group it is the opposite

Beyond demographic parity

If we get back to our COMPAS examples, demographic parity, in the standard classification-based definition, would be translated as

If we get back to the original motivation we gave, it had nothing to do with demographic parity, the first slide had to do with separation, or equalized odds, while the second one had to do with sufficiency, or calibration.

More generally, if we consider a weak version of the independence criterias, we have moments equality, within each protected subgroup,

Let us mention a bit more calibration. Calibration is deeply related to the interpretation of “probabilities” as returned by models as “real probabilities”. In machine learning, it is hard to define properly what those “probabilities” are.

Calibration is related to the following idea, discussed above: if we consider all cases where the predicted probability was 40% (or say, close to 40%), then the proportion on 1’s should be close to 40%.

To conclude that disgression, I can mention the following example highlighting that we should be concerned by probabilities returned by machine learning algorithms. Consider some pictures, generated by some algorithm, and more precisely, some flow of pictures, from a woman to a man

Below, we can see probabilities given by some online appplication, that returns probabilities to be a woman, given a picture. Can’t we agree that it is surprising that those probabilities (of beeing a woman) do not decrease continuous, from the picture in the top left corner and the one in the bottom right one ?

Finally, I can also mention “individual fairness”, or “counterfactual fairness”. Here also, optimal transport can be used, to quantify counterfactual unfairness. But I won’t be too long here.

Finally, an opening for next year’s agenda, with interpretability. Interpretability is a very important issue in actuarial science, which is not as objective as people might think, and the popular

let the data speak for itself

In insurance, interpretation is very important, probably more important than model assumptions

Interpretation become a key concept when dealing with multiple sensitive attributes

To conclude, just a final reminder that dealing with mitigation is a complex philosophical problem….

Tomorrow, we will discuss further at our workshop, in Québec city

Workshop on fairness and discrimination in insurance (registration is open)

Almost two years ago, on May 13th 2022, we organized a Workshop on fairness and discrimination in insurance, JEDA’22, at Laval University (in Québec city), with Marie-Pier Côté.

It was a beautiful sucess, with a lot of persons in person, for one of the first event post-pandemic. The second workshop (JEDA’24) will be organized in less than a month, on May 16th.

Registrations are open ! We will have in the room Fei Huang (UNSW Sidney), David Schraub (Chicago Actuarial Association), Marie-Ève Lainez, Autorité des marchés financiers), Laurence Barry (Chaire PARI), Agathe Fernandes Machado (UQÀM) Mallika Bender (Casualty Actuarial Society), Christopher Cooney (TD Insurance) and Olivier Côté (Université Laval).

Online Seminar Finance & Modeling, Centre d’Économie de la Sorbonne

In a week,  I will give a talk at the Modélisation Financière seminar (“Online Seminar Finance & Modeling” according to the invitation) on Using optimal transport to mitigate unfair predictions. Slides are now on line.

The insurance industry is heavily reliant on predictions of risks based on characteristics of potential customers. Although the use of said models is common, researchers have long pointed out that such practices perpetuate discrimination based on sensitive features such as gender or race. Given that such discrimination can often be attributed to historical data biases, an elimination or at least mitigation is desirable. With the shift from more traditional models to machine-learning based predictions, calls for greater mitigation have grown anew, as simply excluding sensitive variables in the pricing process can be shown to be ineffective. In this talk, we first investigate why predictions are a necessity within the industry and why correcting biases is not as straightforward as simply identifying a sensitive variable. We then propose to ease the biases through the use of Wasserstein barycenters instead of simple scaling. To demonstrate the effects and effectiveness of the approach we employ it on real data and discuss its implications. The talk will be based on recent work with François Hu and Philipp Ratz (2310.20508, 2309.06627, 2306.12912 and 2306.10155).