Natural Catastrophe Insurance: How Should the Government Intervene?

An updated version of the joint paper with Benoit Le Maux is online on http://papers.ssrn.com/.

The present paper develops a new theoretical framework for analyzing the decision to provide or buy insurance against the risk of natural catastrophes. In contrast with conventional models of insurance, the insurer has a non-zero probability of insolvency that depends on the distribution of the risks, the premium rate, and the amount of capital in the company. Among several results, we show that risk-averse policyholders will accept to pay higher rates for a government-provided insurance with unlimited guarantee. However, depending on the correlation between and within the regional risks, a government program can be more attractive to high-correlation than to low correlation areas, which may lead to inefficiencies if the insurance ratings are not appropriately chosen.



Cite this blog post
Arthur Charpentier (2011, December 14). Natural Catastrophe Insurance: How Should the Government Intervene? Freakonometrics. Retrieved May 19, 2024, from https://doi.org/10.58079/oujk

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