I will be in Spain, at the Conference Climate Change and Insurance 2026, to present “Granular Pricing and Effective Withdrawal in Climate-Exposed Household Insurance in France“, written with Raphaël Dalbarade, Laurence Barry and Caroline Hillairet.

Climate change increases the value of fine-scale risk information in household insurance, but its competitive use may weaken pooling and reduce effective availability in exposed areas. We study this mechanism in the French Cat-Nat system, where natural-catastrophe coverage is formally pooled through a regulated surcharge but accessed through the underlying household-insurance contract. First, we use controlled online quote requests to compare otherwise identical addresses with different flood or clay shrink-swell exposure. The evidence shows heterogeneous insurer responses: coarse pooling, within-commune premium differentiation, and non-quoting in some exposed micro-locations. Second, we develop a stylized dynamic pricing game with insurers that differ in pricing granularity. Numerical equilibria show that fine segmentation attracts low-risk households, shifts high-risk households toward less granular insurers, and erodes implicit cross-subsidies. Market-share constraints mainly slow this reallocation. The results highlight why climate-insurance governance must monitor local availability, not only formal coverage or aggregate market presence.

Slides are available online.