Somewhere else, part 92

(picture via…)

Some writings worth reading

Rather, fixing peer review has to begin with you, the reviewer, telling yourself “maybe I would have done it another way myself, but it’s not my paper.” You need to adopt a mentality of “is it good how the author did it” rather than “how could this paper be made better” (read: how would I have done it). That is the whole of being a good reviewer, the rest is commentary. That said, here’s the commentary.” [to be continued…]

You can (try to) read the report here.  What grabbed my attention is the emphasis Deloitte places on “culture”, and so I read on. The first finding is that 65% of the sample believe there is a problem, but only half of these see an issue at their own institution.  Three quarters think that compensation was a significant factor in creating the problems, but only a quarter felt their own institution was at fault. At first sight these results seem wrong, there is agreement on the issue but most people are not taking responsibility.  With a bit of thought though, the results are coherent, if a third of the respondents worked at problem banks it is not unreasonable that two thirds of respondents recognise the fact.  However given the breadth of problems in UK banking – from leverage based speculation, through LIBOR/FX fixing, money laundering at overseas branches,  to retail mis-selling – I think the lay observer of UK banking has a right to raise their eyebrows at the results. When asked to identify “What went wrong” bankers identified the main causes as poor leadership and incentives, both issues that are within banks’ abilities to control and Deloitte sees these issues as being cultural.  Externally, bankers identified issues with light touch regulation but accepted that it was difficult for the regulator to retain the right skills to challenge the banks. I don’t disagree with these observations but I do think they highlight a significant issue.  The system appears to be based on carrots and sticks: rational utility maximisers will attempt to break the system and so have to be constrained by rules and sanctions.  I believe this carrot-stick dynamic is fundamentally unstable, not least because the people chasing the carrots are often faster than those wielding the sticks (the issue of the regulators competencies in complex, dynamic markets)” [to ve continued…]

Of the funds … in 1995, less than 40% still existed in 2013. The remaining funds closed/merged into other funds.” [to be continued….]

et un peu de lecture (ou d’enregistrements en français)

Did I miss something?

(une petite pensée pour les lecteurs de la presse française pour conclure)

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