Tag Archives: water

Nonconvexity, and playing indoor paintball

Following the two previous posts (here and there), on the number of people that don’t get wet while playing with water pistols, consider now an indoor version, in a non-convex room (i.e. player behind wall are now, somehow, protected). In the previous posts, players where playing on a square field, and I briefly mentioned that if the field was a disk, results would have been (roughly) the same: so far, the shape of the field was not an issue. But what if the field is no longer convex,

library(sp)
plot(0:2,0:2,col="white",xlab="",ylab="")
MAP=Polygon(cbind(c(0,0,1,1,2,2,0),
c(0,2,2,1,1,0,0)))
polygon(MAP@coords,col="light blue")

and players hidden behind the wall cannot be reached (red lines above are impossible hits). As earlier, it is still possible to look at the closest neighbor, we just have to exclude pairs that can no longer hit each other.

And again, it is possible to plot safe zones in green.

Once again, it is possible to look more closely are those supposed-to-be “safe zones”, i.e. by looking at the distribution of the location of players that were dry at the end of the game. With 11 players, we obtain


What about the distribution of the number of dry players, over a game ?

touch=function(x1,y1,x2,y2,n=251){
X=seq(x1,x2,length=n)
Y=seq(y1,y2,length=n)
sum(point.in.polygon(X,Y,MAP@coords[,1],
MAP@coords[,2], mode.checked=FALSE)==0)==0
}

NOTWETnc=function(n,p){
sx=runif(50)*2;sy=runif(50)*2
IN=which(point.in.polygon(sx,sy,MAP@coords[,1],
MAP@coords[,2], mode.checked=FALSE)==1)
Sx=sx[IN];Sy=sy[IN]
Sx=Sx[1:n];Sy=Sy[1:n]
IN=IN[1:n]
MI=matrix(NA,n,n)
for(i in 1:(n-1)){
for(j in (i+1):(n)){
MI[j,i]=MI[i,j]=touch(Sx[i],Sy[i],Sx[j],Sy[j])
}}
(d=as.matrix(dist(cbind(Sx,Sy),
method = "euclidean",upper=TRUE)))
diag(d)=999999
dpossible=d
dpossible[MI==FALSE]=999999
dmin=apply(dpossible,2,which.min)
#whonotwet=( (1:n) %notin% names(table(dmin)) )
notwet=n-length(table(dmin))
return(notwet)}

NOTWET=function(n){
x=runif(n)
y=runif(n)
(d=as.matrix(dist(cbind(x,y),
method = "euclidean",upper=TRUE)))
diag(d)=999999
dmin=apply(d,2,which.min)
notwet=n-length(table(dmin))
return(notwet)}

NSim=10000
Nnc=Vectorize(NOTWETnc)(n=rep(11,NSim))
Nc=Vectorize(NOTWET)(n=rep(11,NSim))
T=table(Nc)
Tn=table(Nnc)
plot(as.numeric(names(Tn)),
Tn/NSim,type="b",col="blue")
lines(as.numeric(names(T)),
T/NSim,type="b",col="red",pch=4)

On 11 players, we have the same distribution as the one on a square field. So convexity is not a key issue here…

Strange isn’t it. And with an odd number of player, not only there is at least one dry player, but at least, half of the players (maybe minus one) have to be wet…

Where hiding if you don’t want to get wet ?

Following the previous post, two additional remarks. Following a comment by@cosi, I have investigated quickly a binomial fit to the distribution of the number of people not getting wet, with a fixed number of players on the field. It looks like it should be a binomial distribution with a fixed probability (2/3) and with size parameter affine in the number of players. @guigui suggested some connexion with with “birds on a wire” problem (see e.g. http://www.cut-the-knot.org/)

n=p=rep(NA,20)
for(i in 1:20){
NSim=10000
N=Vectorize(NOTWET)(n=rep(3+2*i,NSim))
n[i]=mean(N)/(1-var(N)/mean(N))
p[i]=1-var(N)/mean(N)
}
plot(seq(5,43,by=2),n,col="red",type="b")

for the implied size parameter above, and below the implied probability parameter.

plot(seq(5,43,by=2),p,col="blue",type="b")

(as functions of the number of players). I’d be glad to get more details on that 2/3 probability.

Now, let us investigate another question sent by email: “Where should you hide if you don’t want to get wet ?” A first idea could be the following: given that some players are already on the field, where should I go if I do not want to get wet ? Below are some simulations for 7 or 25 players (already on the field). The red area is the area so that I will become someone’s target (perhaps even the target of two players…). The green area is the safe zone.

(with 7 players above, and 25 below)

It looks like, on the border, it might be safer than in the middle of the field. But we have to confirm that intuition… or at least see if that intuition is valid.

Based on what was done the other day, it is possible to look where people that got wet were located (instead of counting dry players as done in the previous function). So here, we simply look where non wet players were standing

NOTWET=function(n,p){
x=runif(n)
y=runif(n)
(d=as.matrix(dist(cbind(x,y), method = "euclidean",upper=TRUE)))
diag(d)=999999
dmin=apply(d,2,which.min)
whonotwet=( (1:n) %notin% names(table(dmin)) )
#plot(x[-whonotwet],y[-whonotwet],pch=19,col="blue",type="p")
#points(x[whonotwet],y[whonotwet],pch=19,col="red")
M=matrix(NA,p,p);u=seq(0,1,by=1/p)
for(i in 1:p){
for(j in 1:p){
M[i,j]=sum((x[whonotwet]>=u[i])&(x[whonotwet]<u[i+1])&
(y[whonotwet]>=u[j])&(y[whonotwet]<u[j+1]))
}}
return(M)}

based on function

"%notin%" <- function(x, y) x[!x %in% y]

On a given grid, we count people playing the game that ended dry (with might avoid boundary bias on nonparametric smooth estimator of distribution, as we’ll see later on). For instance with 11 players,

M11=matrix(0,25,25);
for(s in 1:100000){
M11=M11+NOTWET(11,25)
}

Then we can plot the distribution, on the field,

COL=rev(heat.colors(101)); p=25
u=seq(0,1,by=1/p)
plot(0:1,0:1,col="white",xlab="",ylab="")
for(i in 1:p){
for(j in 1:p){
polygon(c(u[i],u[i],u[i+1],u[i+1]),
 c(u[j],u[j+1],u[j+1],u[j]),border=NA,
col=COL[trunc(M11[i,j])/max(M11)*100+1])
}}

Red means a lot of non-wet people (i.e safer zones). Graphs below are with 7 and 11 players respectively (from the left to the right)

with the following distribution on the diagonal: corners are almost 4 times safer than the middle of the field, with 7 players,

Below are plotted distributions of locations of non-wet players when the total number of players was either 25 (on the left) and 101 (on the right)

with again on the diagonal

Hence, the border is rather safe, but next to the border, it is no safe any longer: is someone is standing right on the border, he will probably shoot at you: there is no one behind him ! This explains the stange behavior on the borders (and corners, thanks JP for the intuitive explanation).
But would it be completely different with a field shaped as a disk ?

using the previous technique of working on a fixed grid (or correcting for boundary bias, since the disk might cover only a fraction of the grid-square), or keeping coordinates of non-wet players, and using standard kernel-based estimator of the distribution (the light yellow circle outside the disk is simply due to bias of the kernel estimator on the border)

NOTWET=function(n){
x=(runif(n*20)*2-1)*1
y=(runif(n*20)*2-1)*1
I=which((x^2+y^2<1))
x=x[I];y=y[I]
x=x[1:n];y=y[1:n]
(d=as.matrix(dist(cbind(x,y),
method = "euclidean",upper=TRUE)))
diag(d)=999999
dmin=apply(d,2,which.min)
whonotwet=( (1:n) %notin% names(table(dmin)) )
return(cbind(x[whonotwet],y[whonotwet]))
}

M=t(c(0,0))
for(s in 1:10000){
M=rbind(M11,NOTWET(25))
}
M=M[-1,]

library(ks)
HP=matrix(c(.001,0,0,.001),2,2)
K=kde(x=M11, H=HP)
image(K$eval.points[[1]],K$eval.points[[2]],K$estimate2,
col=rev(heat.colors(101)),xlim=c(-1,1),ylim=c(-1,1))

 

And note that the distribution of the number of players ending the game dry is the same, for a square field, or a disk,

NOTWET2=function(n){
x=(runif(n*20)*2-1)*1
y=(runif(n*20)*2-1)*1
I=which((x^2+y^2<1))
x=x[I];y=y[I]
x=x[1:n];y=y[1:n]
(d=as.matrix(dist(cbind(x,y), 
method = "euclidean",upper=TRUE)))
diag(d)=999999
dmin=apply(d,2,which.min)
notwet=n-length(table(dmin))
return(notwet)}

NOTWET=function(n){
x=runif(n)
y=runif(n)
(d=as.matrix(dist(cbind(x,y), 
method = "euclidean",upper=TRUE)))
diag(d)=999999
dmin=apply(d,2,which.min)
notwet=n-length(table(dmin))
return(notwet)}

NSim=100000
Nsquare=Vectorize(NOTWET)(n=rep(25,NSim))
Ndisk=Vectorize(NOTWET2)(n=rep(25,NSim))
Tsq=table(Nsquare)
Tdk=table(Ndisk)
plot(as.numeric(names(Tsq)),Tsq/NSim,
type="b",col="red")
lines(as.numeric(names(Tdk)),Tdk/NSim,
type="b",pch=4,col="blue")


But so far, it was still simple… I wonder what it might become if we consider a non-convex place, with walls, where player might hide…. Next time, a post on indoor paint-ball !

Playing with fire (or water)

A few days ago,http://www.futilitycloset.com/published a short post based on the fourth problem of the 1987 Canadian Mathematical Olympiad (from on a problem from the 6th All Soviet Union Mathematical Competition in Voronezh, 1966). The problem is simple (as always). It is about water pistol duels (with an odd number of players)

The answer is nice, an can be read on the blog.

What puzzled me in this problem is the following: if we know, for sure, that at least one player won’t get wet, we don’t know exactly how many of them won’t get wet (assuming that if they shoot at the closest, they hit him for sure) ? It is simple to run simulations, e.g. assuming that players are uniformly distributed over a square,

NOTWET=function(n){
x=runif(n)
y=runif(n)
(d=as.matrix(dist(cbind(x,y), method = "euclidean",upper=TRUE)))
diag(d)=999999
dmin=apply(d,2,which.min)
notwet=n-length(table(dmin))
return(notwet)}

It is then rather simple to get the distribution of the number of player that did not get wet,

N25=Vectorize(NOTWET)(n=rep(25,NSim))
T=table(N25)
plot(as.numeric(names(T)),T/NSim,type="b")

The graph for different values for the total number of players is the following (based on 25,000 simulations)

If we investigate further, say with 51 players, we have a distribution for the total number of players that did not get wet which looks exactly like the Gaussian distribution,

NSim=25000
N51=Vectorize(NOTWET)(n=rep(51,NSim))
T=table(N51)
plot(as.numeric(names(T)),T/NSim,type="b",col="blue")
u=seq(0,51,by=.1)
lines(u,dnorm(u,mean(N51),sd(N51)),col="red",lty=2)

If anyone has an intuition (not to say a proof) for that, I’d be glad to hear it…

When should I optimally shoot at my son ? (part 2)

Following my previous post of yesterday, online here, assume now that I do not know if my son came when I turned my back at time, and missed me… Then the payoff function is the one propose by Vincent, i.e.

https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel100.png

In that particular case,

https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel20.png

becomes

https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel101.png

i.e.

https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel102.png

If we draw those functions, on [0,1], the optimal value is solution of https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel103.png

i.e. https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel104.png (we focus only on solutions in [0,1]). Because here the game is symmetric, my son should also shoot at time https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel105.png
Thus, the payoff is then

 https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel106.png

Since we consider here a  zero-sum game, this cannot be a solution of the game. So the game does not have pure strategy solution.

Assume that now I have a mixed strategy, i.e. a distribution of the optimal time to shot. My strategy has distribution https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel110.png, with density https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel111.png (we assume here that the density exists, or we seek only solution that are differentiable). Assume further that there exists https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel112.png>0 such that the support of my optimal shooting time (the time to shoot is now a random variable) is (https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel112.png,1] (or [https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel112.png,1] since we assume that https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel110.png is differentiable). There is a discussion at the end of Vincent’s post where he needs that assumption, at the end. Actually, I think we can make it now, since we can rationally assume that
I will not shot at time 0 (even on a neighborhood of 0 since I have zero chance to hit my son).
The expected payoff function, assuming that my son shoots at time y is

https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel1113.png

Since the zero-sum game is symmetric, again, the expected payoff should be zero. It comes that necessarily,

https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel120.png

if https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel121.png. Hence, if we differentiate (with respect to y), we have

https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel122.png

and if we differentiate one more time, it comes

https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel123.png

i.e. a general solution should be of the form https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel130.png.
Here, we have the same solution as the one considered in Vincent’s blog. His solution is obtained as follows (with slightly different expressions) conditional to https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel03.png, my expected payoff is

https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel140.png

i.e.

https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel131.png

With a simple integration by parts,

https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel132.png

where https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel134.png, i.e.

https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel133.png

Thus,

https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel135.png

So, if we want to be indifferent to https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel03.png‘s strategy, https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel141.png, where

https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel142.png

with https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel143.png,

https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel144.png

Consider solutions https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel150.png, then https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel151.png=1, i.e. either https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel152.png=1 and then https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel153.png is constant, or https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel152.png=-1. This means that https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel154.png is in proportional to https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel155.png.
If we substitute in the equation we had, initially, it comes that

https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel160.png

i.e.

https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel161.png

If we consider https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel03.png=a and https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel03.png=1, it comes that https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel112.png=1/3 while https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel162.png=1/4 (but we don’t really care about that normalizing constant).
It means that we should not start shooting before 1/3 of the tank is fulled. Actually, it makes sense, since

https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel163.png

if https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel03.png<1/3 (while https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel164.png=0 if  https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel03.png>1/3).

When should I optimally shoot at my son ? (part 1)

when playing with water guns ! It is not a reverse oedipal fantasy, it is simply a (stochastic) game. Actually, that game was mentioned here, in the context of a duel with laser guns, and the answer is there. Vincent (alias @Vicnent) presented the problem this way: consider a single combat between two single warriors (a duel) with laser guns. The probability to kill the other one is proportional to time https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel01.png (duel started at time 0). Initially, the have no chance to kill the other one, and after one hour, they are certain to kill the other one. At time https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel01.png, they kill the other one with probability https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel01.png (and miss him with probability https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel04.png). What is the optimal time to shot ?

An alternative can be the following (yes, I prefer personal experience to science fiction): consider two warriors playing with water gun. We start with empty guns, and assume that both warriors fill their guns at two different tap water. The more water we have in guns, the more likely the other one will be wet. What is my optimal strategy to stop filling the gun, and start shooting at the other player ?
In order to formalize the game, assume that I will win 1 point if my son gets wet (and not me), I’ll get -1 if I am wet, and not him, and 0 if we are both wet (in Vincent’s game, we have the same payoff matrix, but I find odd to say that I have -1 if I die).
Let https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel02.png and https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel03.png denote time where players shoot. Vincent derived the following expected payoff function: for me (I shoot at time https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel02.png) the payoff is

https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel05.png

If we know that the other player shoot us, but missed us, it should be different: if I shot first, but missed my son, then he should wait until the end, and so, the payoff should be (thanks Jérôme)

https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel06.png

Actually, we can consider a more general game, where probabilities are not proportional to https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel01.png, but functions https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel10.png for me (https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel13.png stands for dad), and https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel11.png for the other player (here my son https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel12.png). The expected payoff becomes,

https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel07.png

Thus my best strategy is obtained by solving

https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel20.png

that is

https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel24.png

Let

https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel23.png

If https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel11.png and https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel10.png are assumed to be continuous (we assume that water goes continuously into the tank of the gun), then there is https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel26.png such that

https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel25.png

If https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel30.png, then https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel32.png and

https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel34.png

and so https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel35.png. So

https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel37.png

Similarly, if https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel31.png, then https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel33.png and

https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel39.png

and so https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel40.png. So

https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel42.png

So finally, the optimal strategy is to shoot at the same time, https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel01.png.
In the game considered initially by Vincent, https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel43.png. Hence, https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/arthur.charpentier/latex/duel01.png=1/2.
But it is also possible that I did not hear my son coming, shooting at me (and missing me). So in that case, the payoff is different, and closer to what Vincent proposed… but that will be in another post…